

Reassessing UN Security Council Resolution 2793 (2025): The “Gang Suppression Force” and the Cycle of Intervention in Haiti

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ABSTRACT

This resolution extends three decades of externally managed interventions whose outcomes have been ambiguous or damaging. On 30 September 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2793, authorizing a new “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) in Haiti. The mission carries a 12-month mandate, a projected strength of 5,500 personnel, and logistical backing from a newly established UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). While framed as an urgent measure to restore security, this resolution perpetuates a model of dependency that undermines Haitian sovereignty. This article examines Resolution 2793 through historical, political, and policy lenses. It argues that the GSF perpetuates structural dependency and sidesteps lessons from previous missions, including failures of accountability, sovereignty erosion, and public-health harm such as the 2010 cholera outbreak. Drawing on documentary analysis, policy reports, and comparative peacekeeping literature, the study evaluates the GSF’s likely efficacy and legitimacy. It concludes by proposing a Haitian-centered policy model for national security architecture grounded in sovereignty, accountability, and national ownership.

Keywords: Accountability; Cycle of Intervention; Gang Suppression Force; Haiti; Haitian-centered Security; Haitian-led Alternatives; Human Rights; Historical Continuities; National Security Reform; Peacekeeping; Post-colonial Intervention; Resolution 2793 (2025); Sovereignty.

1. Introduction

The United Nations Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2793 in September 2025 marks the latest in a long chain of interventions aimed at stabilizing Haiti. The Council voted 12–0 with three abstentions (China, Russia, and Pakistan), to authorize the Gang Suppression Force, a multinational deployment designed to curb the country’s proliferating armed groups. The initiative follows the faltering Kenya-led Multi Security Mission (MSS), which struggled with legal, logistical, and financial constraints.

Officially, the GSF’s purpose is to “restore order, protect lives, and support Haiti’s path toward stability and democracy.” However, decades of repeated peace operations raise a critical question: Does this new formation represent an evolution in peacekeeping strategy, or a recycling of ineffective models that have failed to build sustainable Haitian capacity?

This article situates Resolution 2793 within Haiti’s broader history of international intervention. It analyzes continuities and ruptures in UN missions since 1993, investigates the interplay between foreign involvement and national sovereignty, and assesses emerging alternatives grounded in Haitian agency.

1.1. Study Objectives

1. Examine historical continuities in UN interventions in Haiti since 1993.
2. Assess the policy and institutional implications of Resolution 2793 (2025).
3. Identify recurring accountability and sovereignty challenges.
4. Evaluate the effectiveness of foreign missions in achieving sustainable security.

5. Propose a Haitian-centered security architecture grounded in national ownership.
6. Offer policy recommendations for reforming international engagement with Haiti.

2. Literature Review and Historical Context

Since the early 1990s, Haiti has hosted a succession of UN missions: UNMIH (1993), UNSMIH (1996), UNTMIH (1997), MIPONUH (1997), MINUSTAH (2004–2017), MINUJUSTH (2017–2019), and BINUH (2019–2025). Each carried mandates for democratic restoration, institutional strengthening, or stabilization. Scholars such as Robert Fatton and Béatrice Pouligny have noted that repeated interventions, though justified as humanitarian or technical, often function as instruments of dependency and external control.

Accountability Failures: The most extensive mission, MINUSTAH, was deployed in 2004 after the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Initially praised for deterring insurgent violence, MINUSTAH became synonymous with misconduct and impunity. Investigations by human-rights groups and journalists documented widespread sexual exploitation of women and minors by peacekeepers.

Health and Human Rights Impacts: The 2010 cholera outbreak was traced to waste disposal at a UN base housing Nepalese troops. Scientific studies confirmed the bacterium's origin in that contingent, causing more than 820,000 infections and around 10,000 deaths. Although the UN acknowledged its role, it invoked immunity to avoid liability. For many Haitians, this cemented the perception that foreign forces bring harm without accountability. By 2017, the UN formally ended MINUSTAH, replacing it with MINUJUSTH and later BINUH. This pattern illustrates a repetitive cycle: foreign forces enter with broad mandates, achieve temporary stability, and depart without sustainable institutions in place.

Comparative Perspective: Unlike UN operations in Liberia or Sierra Leone, which successfully transitioned to local police control within a decade, Haiti's missions left no self-sustaining security infrastructure. The Kenya-led MSS was intended as a fresh regional solution but encountered logistical delays, funding deficits, and questions of jurisdiction under Kenyan law. Thus, the Security Council returned to its default response—another mission, another mandate, another experiment.

By 2024, reports from the International Crisis Group and the Caribbean Policy Research Institute found that over 80 percent of Port-au-Prince was under gang influence, demonstrating that international stabilization had failed to restore order.

Critics such as Régis Debray (France's 2004 envoy) even described Haiti as the “pupil of the international community,” implying permanent guardianship rather than partnership. His report to the French Foreign Ministry advocated long-term international tutelage—a concept widely denounced by Haitian intellectuals as neo-colonial and paternalistic.

3. Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative policy-analysis approach combining historical review and documentary analysis. Primary data include UN resolutions, Security Council records, and official press releases related to Resolution 2793. Secondary data encompass peer-reviewed articles, policy briefs, human-rights reports, and legal studies on

peacekeeping accountability. The analysis is structured around three axes: (a) continuities between past and current missions; (b) institutional and ethical failures in previous operations; and (c) viable Haitian-led alternatives. All documents were coded thematically for recurring patterns of accountability, legitimacy, and sovereignty, ensuring systematic triangulation across policy and academic materials.

4. Findings and Analysis

4.1. Resolution 2793 and the Rhetoric of Reform

Resolution 2793 introduces two claimed innovations: a “Gang Suppression Force” and an “international burden-sharing model.” In practice, these constitute superficial structural modifications to existing arrangements. The UNSOH Support Office duplicates the logistical functions previously handled by BINUH. Meanwhile, the “burden-sharing model” transfers security responsibility from a single lead nation to a coalition of contributors under U.S. and U.N. coordination. Such arrangements risk diffusing accountability while entrenching Haiti’s status as an administered space rather than a sovereign actor.

Public statements from the U.S. Secretary of State hailed the resolution as a “critical effort to restore order and support Haiti’s path to democracy.” Yet behind this language lies a pattern of experimentation: each new mission tests a variant of multilateral control without local ownership. In the absence of transparent consultation with Haitian stakeholders, Resolution 2793 repeats the procedural exclusion that has undermined every previous intervention.

4.2. Accountability and Ethical Deficits

Despite decades of lessons learned, the UN has never fully compensated Haitian victims of cholera or sexual violence (Freedman 2018; Alston 2017). Legal petitions filed in U.S. courts were dismissed on grounds of UN immunity. Although the organization launched a “New Approach to Cholera in Haiti” in 2016, funding remains under 10 percent of its pledged target. This failure erodes moral authority and breeds public mistrust. Without an independent claims commission and binding oversight mechanisms, the GSF cannot credibly guarantee accountability.

4.3. Security without Sovereignty

By outsourcing core functions of national defense to foreign entities, Haiti has become what political economists call a “quasi-protectorate (Desrosiers & Sajjad 2018; Fatton 2021; Dupuy 2019).” Customs control, border management, and port security are frequently administered under foreign advisory mandates. Resolution 2793’s language on “coordination with international partners” extends this arrangement, limiting Haiti’s autonomy over its own security apparatus. Such dependency contradicts the UN Charter’s principle of sovereign equality. True security cannot be outsourced; it must be owned and executed by Haitians themselves.

4.4. Root Causes Ignored

Successive missions have treated Haiti’s insecurity as a law-enforcement problem rather than a symptom of deeper political and economic exclusion. Poverty, youth unemployment, and external arms flow fuel gang recruitment.

Weapons continue to enter through maritime routes from Florida and the Dominican Republic. Yet Resolution 2793 devotes minimal attention to these transnational networks, focusing instead on tactical operations within Haiti's territory.

5. Discussion: Sovereignty, Accountability and Alternatives

5.1. Evaluating the UN Model

Three decades of intervention demonstrate that external missions may achieve short-term security but rarely long-term governance reform. Peacekeeping scholars highlight that missions succeed only when they cultivate local legitimacy and embed capacity-building within national institutions. Haiti's experience shows the opposite: missions have eroded public trust, created parallel chains of authority, and fostered a culture of international dependency.

5.2. A Haitian-Led Security Framework

The paper proposes an alternative centered on Haitian agency: mobilizing Haitian veterans from the diaspora to form a national security corps under civilian oversight. Thousands of Haitian-born professionals with military or police training reside in the United States, Canada, and France. With official authorization from the Haitian government, these veterans could assist in retraining local forces, restoring discipline, and transferring skills. A dedicated fund could derive from the existing fee levied on foreign remittances for the National Education Fund, redirecting a portion to security capacity on a temporary basis.

Furthermore, rather than deploying foreign forces, the UN should direct its financial and logistical assistance straight to Haiti's police and defense institutions. Funds currently allocated to the GSF could equip and train a Haitian Security and Stabilization Corps within months. This would generate employment for youth, restore discipline, and strengthen national pride.

5.3. Institutional Safeguards and Transparency

A Haitian-led force must avoid replicating past abuses. This necessitates a code of conduct, human-rights training, and an independent inspectorate to investigate misconduct. Integrating civil-society representatives in oversight committees could strengthen transparency and public confidence. Such domestic accountability would ensure that resources benefit citizens rather than intermediaries or foreign contractors.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Resolution 2793 repeats a pattern of international intervention that has neither secured Haiti nor strengthened its institutions. The GSF is presented as a solution to gang violence, but its design continues to bypass Haitian leadership and continues to repeat the core weaknesses of past missions: limited Haitian agency, diffuse accountability, and overreliance on external security apparatuses.

The resources and personnel being mobilized for another foreign mission should instead be entrusted to Haiti itself. With proper training, and equipment, Haitians can reclaim their territory and rebuild security structures that reflect their values and aspirations.

6.1. Policy Recommendations

1. Redirect Funding to National Institutions: All financial support for foreign deployments should be channeled to the Haitian National Police and Defense Ministry to train, equip, and reform local forces.
2. Establish a Haitian Security and Stabilization Corps: Mobilize qualified Haitian veterans from the diaspora under government authority to assist in retraining domestic forces and mentoring youth cadets.
3. Create Accountability Mechanisms: Institute a national claims commission to address any human-rights violations committed during security operations and to build public trust.
4. Invest in Economic and Civic Recovery: Pair security reform with employment initiatives and community programs that dismantle the social base of gang recruitment.

One could argue that Haiti's security crisis is not merely a problem of gangs but of governance and sovereignty. Repeated international missions have addressed symptoms while ignoring causes. The path forward lies in a Haitian solution crafted by Haitians and supported not supervised by the world. Haiti is a sovereign nation whose people have endured occupation and dependency for too long. The solution to insecurity lies not in foreign boots on Haitian soil but in empowering Haitians to protect and govern themselves. Again, True solidarity means giving Haiti the means not the mandate to secure its own future.

Declarations

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Consent for publication

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Authors' contributions

Author's independent contribution.

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